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The Palestinian Legal System and the Fragmentation of Coercive Power1 
Tobias Kelly 
Development Research Centre, LSE 
 
 
In recent years there has been an increased interest amongst development practitioners in the 
potential role of law in situations of violent conflict. The Middle East has increasingly 
become the focus of this concern. In particular, it has been claimed that the Palestinian 
National Authority (PNA) has failed to provide adequate access to the law for many 
Palestinians, and has instead ruled through patronage and violence. In this context the PNA 
has been the site of repeated calls for legal reform. Legal reform is often treated as a 
technical question of legal procedure or as an issue of the cultural appropriateness of legal 
regimes. This paper takes a third approach, which stresses the political and normative aspect 
of legal processes. It argues that, in order to understand the obstacles to positive legal 
development in situations of political transition, it is necessary to discover the ways in which 
legal practices are understood, used and abandoned in particular contexts. In a context 
where law has no absolute moral value, but is attractive for the substantive claims that can be 
made through it, people are willing to use whatever resources are available to them in order 
to enforce the tangible benefits of legal claims. This opens up the law for political 
manipulation, and encourages what might be called ‘legal patrimonialism’, whereby legal 
entitlements are distributed according to political resources, rather than legal procedures. 
The paper concludes by arguing that in the context of the West Bank the promotion of 
effective legal processes should not be seen as a short cut to a stable political regime. 
Accountable legal processes require  centralised, strong and stable coercive support, based in 
a measure of organisational cohesion and territorial sovereignty.  
 
 
Introduction 
The rule of law and justice shall be the basis of governance, the motivation for the 
work of the governing authorities, and the protector of the rights of the people 
and their democratic values. 
(Draft Palestinian Constitution, Article 13). 
 
In recent years there has been an increased interest amongst development practitioners in the 
potential role of law in situations of violent conflict.2 Not only is violent political conflict 
                                                 
1 The research for this article was made possible for by an ESRC Postgraduate Training Award and an Emslie 
Horniman Scholarship from the Royal Anthropological Institute. An ESRC Postdoctoral Fellowship held at the 
Crisis States Programme, DESTIN, LSE made the writing of this paper possible. I am grateful to Peter Loizos, 
Martha Mundy, James Putzel, Denis Rodgers, Will Norman, Jonathan Curry-Machado and the members of 
Crisis States Programme Research Seminar for their comments. Above all I must thank the people of Palestine 
for their kindness and generosity during the most difficult times.  The fieldwork for this paper was carried out 
between August 2000 and February 2002 in the Ramallah region. The case studies presented below were 
collected through extensive interviews and participant observation in the Ramallah region of the West Bank. 
Where appropriate identifying names have been changed. Although the situation has developed considerably 
since this period, I believe that the same dynamics, as outlined in this paper, are still observable. Comments can 
be sent to: t.w.kelly@lse.ac.uk 
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often seen as resulting in the lack of legal processes, but the restitution of the law is also put 
forward as a way out of prolonged periods of violence. The promotion of the institutions and 
practices of law has therefore become a key aim of many aid agencies.3 The Middle East, 
especially after the events of 11th September 2001, has increasingly become the focus of much 
of this interest, with the absence of the ‘rule of law’, amongst other things, being understood 
as a cause of much of the violence and instability of the region. 4 In this context, Rama Mani 
has argued that there is a “sense that law is a prerequisite for peace… a mechanism for 
restoring long term stability as well as short term order”. 5 Similarly, Thomas Carothers has 
argued that ‘the rule of law’ is increasingly seen as “a panacea for the ills of countries in 
transition”.6  
 
The Palestinian Territories have become a particular site of concern over issues of the ‘rule of 
law’. It has been widely claimed by both the international community and Palestinians that 
legal processes have become increasingly undermined under the Palestinian National 
Authority (PNA), which has instead ruled through patronage and violence.7 Following the 
start of the second intifada in the late summer of 2000, commentators have pointed to a 
“break down in law and order” in the Palestinian Territories.8 In this context the Israeli-
Palestinian Peace Process has increasingly become linked to issues of legal reform under the 
PNA.9 The promotion of legal processes is seen as a key element in the creation of a stable, 
democratic and accountable Palestinian polity that would be able to negotiate a lasting peace 
with Israel on the road to statehood.  
                                                                                                                                                        
2 See, for example: Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, New York: United Nations, 1992, p.34; Neil 
Kritz, ‘The Rule of Law in the Post-Conflict Phase: Building a Stable Peace’, in Chester Crocker, Fen Hampson 
and Pamela Aall (eds), Managing Global Chaos: Sources and Responses to International Conflict, Washington: 
United States Institute for Peace Press, 1996; Benedict Latto, ‘Governance and Conflict Management: 
Implications for Donor Intervention’, Crisis States Working Paper 9, London: Development Research Centre, 
LSE, 2002; Rama Mani, ‘Conflict Resolution, Justice and the Law: Rebuilding the Rule of Law in the Aftermath 
of Complex Political Emergencies’, International Peacekeeping, 5:3 (Autumn 1998), pp.1-25; Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, ‘Concluding Document of the OSCE Copenhagen Conference on the 
Human Dimension, June 29th 1990’, International Legal Materials, 29 (1990), pp.1505-1506. 
3 See, for example: DfID, Justice and Poverty Reduction, London: DfID, 2000; Department of State and USAID, 
Security, Democracy, Prosperity: Strategic Action Plan, Fiscal Years 2004-2009, Aligning Diplomacy and 
Development Assistance, Washington: Department of State and USAID, 2003, p.19. 
4 See, for example: Thomas Carothers, ‘Is Gradualism Possible? Choosing Strategy for Promoting Democracy in 
the Middle East’, Democracy and Rule of Law Project Working Paper 39, Washington: Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, 2003b; Hugh Roberts, ‘North African Islamism in the Blinding Light of 9-11’, Crisis 
States Working Paper 34, London: Development Research Centre, LSE, 2003; United States Institute for Peace, 
Establishing the Rule of Law in Iraq: Special Report, Washington: United States Institute for Peace, 2003. 
5 Mani (1998) p.2. 
6 Thomas Carothers, ‘The Rule of Law Revival’, Foreign Affairs,  77:2 (March/April 1998), pp.95. 
7 See, for example: Nathan Brown, Palestinian Politics After the Oslo Accords: Resuming Arab Palestine, 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003; Council on Foreign Relations, Strengthening Palestinian Public 
Institutions: Independent Task Force Report, Washington: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999; Hillel Frisch, 
‘Modern Absolutism or Neo-Patrimonial State Building? Customary Law, Extended Families and the Palestinian 
Authority’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 29:3 (August 1998), pp.341-358; Glen Robinson, ‘The 
Politics of Legal Reform in Palestine’, Journal of Palestine Studies, 27:1 (Autumn 1997), pp.51-60; United 
Nations Special Coordinator for the Occupied Territories, Rule of Law Development in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip, Survey and State of the Development Effort, Gaza: United Nations Special Coordinator for the Occupied 
Territories, 1999. 
8 Menachem Klein, ‘By Conviction Not by Infliction: The Debate Over Reforming the Palestinian Authority’, 
Middle East Journal, 57:2 (Spring 2003), p.194. 
9 In June 2002, the President of the United Sates, George W. Bush, made a speech outlining his vision for the 
Middle East. In the speech George Bush highlighted the need for legal reform in the Palestinian Authority as one 
of the key steps necessary for the building of what he saw as a sustainable peace in the region (Speech given by 
George W. Bush from the Rose Garden of the White House, 24 June 2002). 
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Issues of legal reform are often treated as technical questions of legal procedure or as issues 
of the cultural appropriateness of legal regimes. This paper takes a third approach, which 
stresses the political and normative aspects of legal processes. It argues that in order to 
understand the obstacles to positive legal development in situations of political transition, it is 
necessary to discover the ways in which legal practices are understood, used and abandoned 
in particular contexts. In the West Bank, rather than issues of procedural efficiency or cultural 
appropriateness, problems of legal access result from the fragmentation of the coercive power 
of the law.  In a context where law has no absolute moral value, but is primarily attractive for 
the substantive claims that can be made through it, people are willing to use whatever 
resources are available to them in order to enforce the tangible benefits of legal claims. This 
opens open up the law for political manipulation, and encourages what might be called ‘legal 
patrimonialism’, whereby legal entitlements are distributed according to political resources, 
rather than legal procedures. Carothers has noted that issues of the ‘rule of law’ in 
development practice are often marked by a conceptual vagueness.10 With this in mind, rather 
than discuss abstract concepts, this paper will examine one concrete aspect of legal processes, 
namely access to, and the distribution of, the formal entitlements of labour law. The paper 
concludes by arguing that in the context of the West Bank the promotion of effective legal 
processes should not be seen as a short cut to a stable political regime. Accountable legal 
processes require a centralised, strong and stable coercive support, based in a measure of 
organisational cohesion and territorial sovereignty.  
 
 
Approaches to Problems of Legal Access 
Often explanations for problems of access to the law in the West Bank are not presented in a 
coherent manner and there is considerable overlap between them. However, two schools of 
thought can clearly be discerned amongst practitioners and academics, both in the West Bank 
and internationally. 11 These approaches can be thought of as the ‘technical efficiency’ 
argument and the ‘cultural compatibility’ argument.12 
 
The ‘technical efficiency’ approach focuses on the internal processes of legal systems. In 
particular, Stephen Golub argues that many donor led ‘rule of law’ programmes concentrate 
on the efficiency of the courts.13 Golub quotes the World Bank’s Legal Vice Presidency as 
claiming that the “rule of law is built on the cornerstone of an efficient and effective judicial 
system”.14 A focus on issues of internal technical efficiency assumes that if court processes 
could be made more efficient, more people would realise their formal legal entitlements. 
Largely for this reason, donor attempts at legal reform in the West Bank have largely focused 
on improving the technical efficiency of the courts. USAID for example, identifies the 
                                                 
10 Thomas Carothers, ‘Promo ting the Rule of Law Abroad: The Problem of Knowledge’, Democracy and Rule of 
Law Project Working Paper 34, Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003a. 
11 A third argument, namely that legal processes are economically too expensive for developing countries is 
widely made in other contexts. However, it seems seldom to be made in the context of the West Bank. See for 
example:  Jêdrzaj Frynas, ‘Problems of Access to Courts in Nigeria: Results of a Survey of Legal Practitioners’, 
Social and Legal Studies, 10:3 (September 2001), pp.397-419.  
12 Whilst these arguments are not made in the form presented by any single person, they represent a distillation 
of arguments put forward during interviews with donors and legal practitioners in the West bank between 2000 
and 2004, as well as a review of the literature included below. 
13 Stephen Golub, ‘Beyond Rule of Law Orthodoxy: The Legal Empowerment Alternative’, Democracy and 
Rule of Law Project Working Paper 41, Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003, pp.7-
9. 
14 Cited in Golub (2003), p.15. 
 4
“building of management and administrative capacity within the judicial system, increasing 
professionalism of the legal community, improving the curriculum and teaching capacity in 
law schools” as the key to strengthening the ‘rule of law’ in the Palestinian Territories.15 The 
main ‘rule of law’ contractor for USAID in the area, DPK, has focused its recent efforts on 
case management and judicial training.16 Similarly, the EU has identified technical assistance 
in the administration of justice, the training of legal professionals and provision of equipment 
and as the key to legal reform.17 Improvements in the efficiency of the courts are seen as 
crucial for reinforcing the ‘rule of law’. 
 
However, a narrow technical view sees legal processes as enclosed and universally replicable 
practices, ignoring the wider political and historical context in which legal regimes operate.18 
In doing so the ‘technical efficiency’ argument treats legal processes as neutral procedural 
concerns, forgetting that people use the law with concrete purposes, and with locally specific 
ideas of justice, authority and accountability. Furthermore, legal processes are not restricted to 
the formal setting of the courts, but interact with multiple formal and informal, official and 
unofficial institutions.19 Rather than treat law as an internally coherent and universally 
replicable process of dispute resolution, there is a need to take into account the perspectives of 
those who use the courts and the wider contexts within which they operate. 
 
One such approach is the ‘cultural compatibility’ argument. From this perspective, courts rely 
on procedures and concepts that are alien to many people in the West Bank, forcing them to 
rely on alternative forms of dispute resolution or never make legal claims at all. For example, 
the DfID policy statement on ‘Safety, Security and Accessible Justice’ argues that courts 
often use procedures that are difficult to understand, and people have a limited knowledge of 
legal rights.20 Similarly, the Palestinian lawyer and anthropologist George Bisharat has argued 
that in the West Bank formal laws and regulations are not the operative principle of social 
action. 21 He goes on to argue that there is a lack of: 
awareness and involvement in the law of the lawyers and the state. State law or 
qanun, especially concerning civil matters, is not a general reference point that 
serves to orient and guide normal transactions among individuals.22  
Bisharat claims that negotiation and compromise is the ‘indigenous’ form of dispute 
resolution. 23 Such an argument has widespread support in the West Bank. Palestinian lawyers 
would routinely complain about the lack of hadarat al-qanun (legal civilisation) amongst the 
local population. This approach is also reflected in the large number of legal education 
projects carried out by NGOs and governmental donors in the region. 24 These range from the 
                                                 
15 USAID, Congressional Budget Justification for West Bank and Gaza Strip, viewed on 26th February 2004 at 
www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2004/asia_near_east/west_bank_gaza.pdf, 2003. 
16 DPK, 2003, Rule of Law Reporter: West Bank/Gaza Rule of Law Project, 1:1 (July 2003), pp.1-8. 
17 EU, ‘Individual Service Contract Forecast: Technical Assistance for the Progra mme ‘Empowering the 
Palestinian Judicial System’ West Bank and Gaza’, viewed on 23 February 2003 at 
www.europa.eu.int/comm.europeaid/tender/data/AOF42522.htm, 2003. 
18 See, for example:  David Trubek & Marc Galanter, ‘Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the 
Crisis in Law and Development’, Wisconsin Law Review, 14:4 (Winter 1974), pp.1062–1101. 
19 See, for example: Sally Engle Merry, Getting Justice and Getting Even: Legal Consciousness Among Working 
Class Americans, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990. 
20 DfID, DfID Policy Statement on Safety, Security and Accessible Justice, London: DfID, 2003. 
21 George Bisharat, Palestinian Lawyers and Israeli Rule: Law and Disorder in the West Bank, Austin: 
University of Austin Press, 1989, pp.36-37. 
22 Bisharat (1989), p.33. 
23 Bisharat (1989), pp.39-42. 
24 See, for example: UNSCOT (1999). 
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training of judges to the teaching of international human rights law to Palestinian civilians. A 
related alternative has been to try and establish alternative and seemingly more culturally 
appropriate forms of dispute resolution. USAID and the Dutch have funded several 
Alternative Dispute Resolution projects in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.25 The assumption 
behind both these approaches is that legal processes must reflect wider cultural practices in 
order to be effective. 
 
However, other writers have argued that far from there being a complete absence of legal 
discourses, the law is often central to the way that people frame their claims across the Middle 
East.  In Egypt, for example, Nathan Brown has written that rather than rejecting the law 
“…as an alien intrusion or as culturally inappropriate, [Egyptians]… have grasped at the tools 
that the …legal system has given them”. 26 In the West Bank the problems of the ‘siyadat al-
qanun’ (rule of law, sovereignty of law) are also widely discussed. There is an implicit 
assumption in the ‘cultural compatibility’ argument that the legal regimes in the West Bank 
and across the Arab world are foreign impositions. However, although the West Bank legal 
system may have its roots in the encounter with the Ottoman Empire, British Mandate, 
Kingdom of Jordan and Israeli state, the imposition of law is never a fait accompli but 
interacts with local political, cultural and economic processes.27 Legal processes are adapted 
to locally specific contexts and lay down deep roots.28  
 
There has been a tendency to see the problems surrounding the 'rule of law’ in the developing 
world as the product of a failed modernity, which is compared to a hypothetical ideal legal 
system that in reality exists nowhere, as legal processes always exist in local contexts.29 As 
Stanley Diamond remarked several decades ago: “law has no essence but a definable 
historical nature”. 30 Law is taken up and transformed in different ways depending on the local 
historical and political context. Rather than posit a universal template for legal processes, it is 
necessary to understand how legal processes develop in specific situations. This paper seeks 
to examine how and why legal claims are understood, used and abandoned in the West Bank. 
Only by doing so can we identify the consequences of issues of legal access for political, 
economic and social relations in countries in transition.  
 
The Tradition of Labour Rights in the West Bank 
Legal claims in the West Bank, and in particular claims over labour rights, have a long and 
locally specific history. 31 The historian Bishara Doumani has argued that by the mid-
nineteenth century, the fellahin (villagers, peasants) of the West Bank were increasingly 
“resorting to urban legal institutions… in order to challenge the authority” of the locally 
                                                 
25 See, for example: USAID (2003). 
26 Nathan Brown, The Rule of Law in the Arab World: Courts in Egypt and the Gulf, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997, p.219. 
27 For a discussion of this issue see: Robert  Kidder, ‘Towards an Integrated Theory of Imposed Law’, in Barbara 
Harrell-Bond & Sandra Burman (eds), The Imposition of Law, New York: Academic Press, 1979. 
28 For example see: Richard Wilson & Jon Mitchell, (eds), Human Rights in Global Perspective: 
Anthropological Studies of Rights, Claims and Entitlements, London: Routledge, 2003. 
29 For a discussion of this issue see: Mark Duffield, ‘Social Reconstruction and the Radicalization of 
Development: Aid as a Relation of Global Liberal Governance’, Development and Change, 33:5 (November 
2002), pp.1059-1071. 
30 Stanley Diamond, ‘The “Rule of Law” Versus the Order of Custom’, Social Research, 38:1 (Spring 1971), 
p.43. 
31 This tradition arguably goes back further than detailed here. For a wider discussion see: Tobias Kelly, Law at 
Work: Law, Labour and Citizenship among West Bank Palestinians, University of London: Unpublished PhD 
Thesis, 2003, pp.39-44. 
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powerful.32 The expanding capitalist economy of the early twentieth century saw the first 
Arab trade unions formed in 1923, although these remained small in comparison to the 
Zionist Histradut.33 However, the Arab unions played a major role in the general strike that 
started the Arab revolt of 1936-39.34 The unions also became increasingly important just 
before the Second World War, particularly in the military camps run by the British Army. By 
the late 1940s labour militancy was a firmly established tradition in the West Bank. 
 
After 1948 the West Bank was incorporated into the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The 
unions became increasingly influenced by the Communist party and were banned in 1952. 
Then in 1967 the West Bank was occupied by the Israel military. With the encouragement of 
the Palestinian nationalist factions, the trade union movement began to reorganise.35 The 
unions became increasingly radical throughout the 1970s and 80s and organised strikes and 
demonstrations demanding basic labour rights. However, at the same time the Israeli military 
accused the union movement of being a front for Palestinian nationalist groups, and forced it 
to go underground. By the late 1980s, the largely clandestine union movement had become 
divided between the various branches of Palestinian nationalist politics.36 It was not until 
1993 that the unions unified to form the Palestinian General Federation of Trade Unions 
(PGFTU). However, with the creation of the PNA in the early 1990s, many activists left the 
movement to take up positions with the PNA. By the late 1990s the unions had yet to recover 
as a collective force from the crises in the 1980s and mid-1990s, and instead focused on 
individual labour cases in the Israeli and Palestinian courts. 
 
Throughout the 1970s and 80s many Palestinian began to work in the Israeli economy. By the 
1980s Palestinians working in the Israeli economy made up almost 40% of the Palestinian 
labour force.37 These Palestinians were under the jurisdiction of Israeli labour law, and their 
experiences of this law are crucial for an understanding of approaches to labour rights in the 
region. Israeli labour law promises greater severance pay and insurance, amongst other things, 
than local West Bank law. By the 1990s, helped by several NGOs, many Palestinians had 
cases in the Israeli labour courts. Although a large number of Palestinians worked illegally in 
Israel, and therefore had only problematic access to the protection of Israeli law, the potential 
benefits of winning a case in the Israeli courts were widely recognised, and many Palestinians 
were being awarded relatively large sums of money. As Palestinians were not allowed to join 
unions inside Israel, recourse to the law was one of the few avenues for labour protection. 38 
 
It is in this historical context that legal claims must be understood in the West Bank. Although 
access to legal rights was associated with the actions of an arbitrary and often hostile 
occupying power, they frequently provided means of economic support.  
                                                 
32 Bishara Doumani, Rediscovering Palestine: Merchants and Peasants in Jabal Nablus, 1700-1900, Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1995, p.169. 
33 For more on this issue see: Musa Budeiri, The Palestinian Communist Party, 1919-1948: Arab and Jew in the 
Struggle for Internationalism, London: Ithaca Press, 1979. 
34 For a discussion of these strikes see: Zachary Lockman, Comrades and Enemies: Arab and Jewish Workers in 
Palestine, 1906-1948, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996, pp.240-26.   
35 For a history of the West Bank trade union movement see: Joost Hilterman, Behind the Intifada, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1991. 
36 Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
and the Communist Party were all linked with their own unions. 
37 For a more detailed analysis of Palestinian labour in the Israeli economy see: Leila Farsakh, Palestinian 
Employment in Israel: 1967-1997: A Review, Ramallah: MAS, 1998. 
38 For more on the relationship between Israeli unions and Palestinian labour see: Michael Shalev, ‘Jewish 
Organized Labor and the Palestinians: A Study of State/Society Relations in Israel’, in Baruch Kimmerling (ed.), 
The Israeli State: Boundaries and Frontiers, New York: SUNY Press, 1989. 
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The Fragmentation of the Coercive Power of the Law  
In order to understand the basis of ‘legal patrimonialism’ during the second intifada it is also 
necessary to understand the history of the fragmentation of the coercive power of the law. 
Before the creation of the PNA the formal institutions of the law in the West Bank had been 
undermined by several factors. In 1967, in protest at the Israeli occupation, many Palestinian 
lawyers had gone out on a strike that was to last, at least in part, until 1994.39 At the same 
time, the Israeli military established military tribunals. Although these tribunals only 
nominally covered ‘security matters’, they increasingly began to become involved in other 
civil and criminal issues, such as taxation and land disputes.40 Following the start of the first 
intifada in the late 1980s there was a renewed call by the Palestinian nationalist leadership to 
boycott the courts. New nationalist orientated forums were set up to hear disputes.  These 
forums’ decisions were enforced by the armed groups associated with the various Palestinian 
political factions.41 It was in this context of having been undermined by the actions of the 
Israeli military and Palestinian leadership over several decades, that the PNA took over 
control of the West Bank court system. This responsibility did not include the Israeli military 
tribunals, Municipal courts in the Israeli settlements, or Rabbinical courts, which remained 
under the control of the Israeli state. Following the Oslo Accords the coercive power of the 
law became increasingly fragmented in the West Bank. This situation was intensified by the 
actions of the PNA police force and the territorial fragmentation of the PNA. 
 
The organisation of the police force of the PNA under the Oslo agreements meant that the 
enforcement of the law was increasingly problematic. Despite the fact that by the year 2000 it 
was estimated that there was one policeman for every 110 Palestinians, the willingness and 
the ability of the Palestinian police to enforce court orders was limited by several factors.42 
Six branches of the Palestinian police force were established after the Oslo Accords, with 
each of these branches having their roots in pre-PNA armed groups associated with the 
PLO.43  The officer corps of the Civilian Police was largely staffed by officers of the former 
Palestinian Liberation Army. One of the elite branches of the PNA police force, known as 
Force 17, had its roots in the group that protected Yasser Arafat during the Lebanese civil war 
of the 1970s and 80s. The Preventative Security (PS), which largely focused on the arrest and 
detention of Palestinian activists hostile to the Oslo Peace Process, was largely made up of 
local Fatah activists.44 Jibril Rajoub, the former West Bank head of the PS, described his 
organisation as “the practical expression of Fatah”.45 Although the civilian branch of the 
police was nominally responsible for the enforcement of court orders, in practice several other 
branches of the police were also involved. Whilst the Oslo Accords had formally established 
                                                 
39 For more on the strike see: Bisharat (1989). 
40 For more on the Israeli military courts see: Lisa Hajjar, Authority, Resistance and the Law: A Study of the 
Israeli Military Court System in the West Bank and Gaza, Berkeley: University of California Press, forthcoming. 
41 For more on this issue see Adrien Wing, ‘Legal Decision-Making During the Palestinian Intifada: Embryonic 
Self-Rule’, Yale Journal of International Law, 18:1 (Winter 1993), pp.95-153. 
42 Graham Usher has argued that the PNA police were mainly established in order to crack down on Hamas. See: 
Graham Usher, ‘The Politics of Internal Security: The Palestinian Authority’s New Security Services’, in George 
Giacaman and Dag Lonning (eds.), After Oslo: New Realities: Old Problems, London: Pluto, 1998. See also: 
Beverly Milton-Edwards, ‘Internal Security and Citizenship Under the Palestinian National Authority’, in Nils 
Butenschon, Uri Davis, and Manuel Hassassian (eds), Citizenship and the State in the Middle East, Syracuse: 
Syracuse University Press, 2000. 
43 These were the Civilian Police, Presidential Security (Force 17), Preventative Security (PS), General 
Intelligence, the Public Security Force and Civil Defence. 
44 These were largely Hamas activists, but also included people associated with the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and Islamic Jihad. 
45 Al-Quds newspaper, 2 February 1995 
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all the branches of the police force, there was no clear legislation that governed the 
relationship between the PNA police and the courts. In practice the PLO Revolutionary Penal 
Code of 1979 was applied to offences committed by PNA police officers.46 It was not until 
2002 that it was made an offence for the police not to enforce court rulings.47 Due to their 
history in the armed struggle of the PLO, the various branches of the police force often acted 
more as political factions than as police. This legal and political ambiguity meant that PNA 
court orders were subject to political pressures and often went un-enforced.  
 
The Oslo Accords also affected the organisation of the coercive power of the law in other 
ways. Under the Oslo Accords, the West Bank was divided into three areas (see Map 1). In 
Area A, which covered the main Palestinian towns, the PNA had civil and security control. In 
Area B, which covered most Palestinian villages, the PNA was given civil control, but shared 
security control with the Israeli military. In Area C, which covered most of the land in 
between the towns and villages, the Israeli military had full control. Israeli military control 
was also extended to cover all Israeli citizens no matter where they were in the West Bank. 
Crucially however, whilst the Palestinian police did not have territorial control over most of 
the West Bank, the PNA courts had jurisdiction over Palestinians throughout the area. The 
enforcement of Palestinian court orders in areas outside the immediate control of the 
Palestinian police forces therefore entailed cooperation between the Palestinian and Israeli 
police. Following the start of the second intifada this cooperation broke down. The District 
Coordination Office (DCO), which was supposed to liase between the Israeli state and the 
PNA, became in some places the scene of clashes between the Israeli military and the 
Palestinian police forces. The Israeli government increasingly accused elements of the 
Palestinian police force of attacks on the Israeli military and civilians. As a result, the Israeli 
Air Force repeatedly bombed the offices of the Palestinian police, and in the autumn of 2000 
destroyed the office of the Enforcement Division of the PNA police in Ramallah.  
 
In this context, Palestinian police often refused to act outside the centre of Palestinian towns, 
even if the area in question was nominally under PNA jurisdiction. Many feared arrest or 
worse by Israeli military. 48 Whilst the Israeli police could work relatively freely in the rest of 
the West Bank and were responsible for the enforcement of PNA court orders, Palestinians 
would refuse to turn to the Israeli police out of fear of being accused of being collaborators. 
The result was that following the start of the second intifada, PNA court orders could only be 
enforced in the centre of the large Palestinian towns, if at all.  
 
In this context, the enforcement of legal orders through the formal legal system was 
increasingly problematic. Not only was the territorial power of the PNA severely restricted, 
but also the PNA police forces often enforced the law according to political pressure rather 
than legal procedure. Many Palestinians turned to alternative avenues through which they 
could enforce their legal claims. In doing so they produced a form of ‘legal patrimonialism’, 
whereby legal claims were enforced according to political connections, rather than legal 
procedures. 
 
                                                 
46 Interview with senior police officer, Ramallah, 18 June 2001. 
47 PNA Basic Law 2001, Article 97. 
48 Interview with PNA Prosecutor, Ramallah, 19 January 200l. After the April 2002 Israeli invasion of 
Palestinian towns, PNA police officers refused to war their uniforms, fearing that they would become targets for 
the Israeli military. They continued to operate however, in civilian clothes. 
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The Governor of Ramallah District 
One of the organisations that many Palestinian turned to in order to try and enforce their legal 
claims was the office of Abu-Firas, the Governor of Ramallah. The Governor’s office was 
part of a sprawling complex, which had started life as a British prison during the 1930s. The 
same complex housed the Presidential office of Yasser Arafat, as well as barracks for several 
branches of the Palestinian police force49. Yasser Arafat had appointed Abu-Firas shortly after 
the creation of the PNA in the mid 1990s.50 As Governor of Ramallah district, Abu-Firas was 
nominally responsible for coordinating the activities of all the PNA police forces in the area. 
Before the creation of the PNA, Abu-Firas had been a member of the PLO’s Western Sector 
wing, which played a central role in the PLO’s efforts to organise the first intifada. Abu-Firas 
was therefore closely associated with the PLO and the PNA leadership. Lawyers and judges 
often complained that Abu-Firas encouraged the use of what they called ‘urf (customary law). 
However, the Governor’s legal department claimed the authority to intervene in disputes on 
the basis of several laws currently in force in the West Bank.51 The head of the Governor’s 
legal department, Dr Arij al-‘Awda, who had a PhD in jurisprudence from the University of 
Moscow, claimed that far from her office being ‘outside the law’, people often came to her 
office with their lawyers and the majority of her employees were trained jurists.52 It was also 
widely rumoured that the Governor of Ramallah had links with the gangs from ‘Amari 
refugee camp in Ramallah. These gangs were accused of being involved in stealing cars from 
Israel and also formed the basis of the shabiba (the youth wing of Fatah) in the refugee 
camps. The Governor’s office therefore stood at the intersection of legal/illegal, 
official/unofficial political forces in the West Bank. 
 
Three case studies will now be examined in order to understand the role played by the 
Governor’s office and the courts in the enforcement of the law. The case studies were all 
collected in the Ramallah region of the West bank between August 2000 and March 2002. 
These case studies represent a representative sample of a much larger project.53  
 
Case Study 1: Al-Quds Tissue Factory 
The Al-Quds factory was one of the largest and oldest in the West Bank and was owned by 
the three sons of its Armenian-Palestinian founder. After the second intifada started in late 
September 2000 the factory had faced a crisis. Many of its workers, who came from villages 
outside Ramallah, could not reach the factory due to the checkpoints that had been set up on 
the roads into Ramallah by the Israeli military. Furthermore, the factory could not get hold of 
any raw materials due to the roadblocks. Finally, most of their customers stopped buying their 
goods or claimed they could no t pay the money that they owed the factory. After two months 
of this situation, the factory owners decided to scale down the work in the factory and to place 
nearly all the workers on unpaid leave.  
 
                                                 
49 In April 2002 the compound which housed the Governor’s office and Arafat’s headquarters was partially 
destroyed by the Israeli military. However, the Governor’s office still continued to work in the partly collapsed 
building. 
50 Popular legend has it that it was Abu-Firas who drove Yasser Arafat around on his clandestine visit to the 
West Bank in the late 1960s. Abu-Firas was later expelled from the West Bank by the Israeli government and 
became an assistant to Abu-Jihad, the deputy leader of Fatah, who was assassinated in Tunis in 1988. 
51 Administrative Divisions Regulation No. l of 1966. The 1954 Jordanian Law to Prohibit Crimes gives local 
Governors the power to ‘prohibit crimes’, arrest people and put them under curfew if he ‘suspects’ they will 
commit a crime. Other security services set up similar legal departments, citing the same precedent.  
52 Interview with Dr. al-‘Awda, Director of the Legal Department for the Ramallah Governate, Ramallah, 25 
September 200l. 
53 See Kelly (2003). 
 10
Some of the workers, who were organised in a workers’ committee, protested. The owners of 
the factory tried to strike a deal, by saying that they were not laying off the workers, just 
placing them on unpaid leave, and therefore they did not have to pay any money.  However, 
the workers argued that they either they had jobs and should be paid, or they had lost their 
jobs and under the law were entitled to full severance pay. The workers’ committee went to 
the Palestinian General Federation of Trade Unions (PGFTU) branch office in Ramallah in 
order to get some advice and support. In the 1980s there had been a number of disputes 
between the forerunner of the PGFTU and the Al-Quds factory over pay and conditions.  
 
Following the involvement of the PGFTU, a number of high profile demonstrations were held 
outside the factory. These demonstrations were amongst the largest that the union had 
organised since the creation of the PNA and brought what was generally seen as a declining 
union movement to the attention of many people for the first time. Against a background of 
rising Palestinian unemployment and increasingly violent clashes between Palestinians and 
the Israeli military, placards were held up at the demonstrations claiming that “Al-Quds 
implements the Israeli occupation policies” and “The Al-Quds factory steals the bread from 
our children’s mouths”. The dispute was widely covered in local newspapers and on 
television stations in the Ramallah area. On the suggestion of the PGFTU the dispute was 
taken to the office of the PNA Governor of Ramallah. The workers said tha t it would take too 
long to take the case through the courts, as they needed the money they were due immediately 
in order to support their families. The factory owners reluctantly agreed to the involvement of 
the Governor of Ramallah.   
 
After meeting both sides, Abu-Firas delegated the day-to-day negotiations to his legal 
department. In the negotiations, which lasted several days, the factory owners argued that the 
factory was itself owed money and therefore could not pay the workers’ severance pay. The 
Governor’s office promised to help the company chase up some of its debtors. The union 
demanded that the Governor’s office enforce the labour law, and make sure the workers 
received severance pay. Finally, the Governor’s office agreed to enforce a compromise. The 
factory owners would take 12 of the longest working and most skilled workers back in order 
to keep the factory working at a minimum level. The other 65 would receive severance pay at 
three-quarters of the money owed according to the labour law. 54 The union accepted the 
agreement on behalf of the workers. 
 
Case Study 2: Sinjal Stone-Cutting Factory 
The Sinjal stone cutting factory stood in the outskirts of Ramallah. The factory cut the white 
stone that was used to cover the outside of grand houses across the West Bank, or when 
polished, was used on the inside of buildings such as the Governor’s office. A Palestinian 
who had made a fortune in the Saudi Arabian building trade during the oil boom of the early 
seventies owned the factory. The factory owner still lived in Saudi Arabia, but his brother- in-
law managed the factory. Since the creation of the Palestinian Authority in 1994 there had 
been a building boom across Ramallah, with new homes and office blocks going up every day 
as the once small town began to spread out across the top of the neighbouring hills and engulf 
the surrounding villages. The stone cutting factory had therefore never been short of business.  
 
Following the start of the intifada in late September 2000 business became increasingly 
difficult at the factory. After two months of slow work the factory manager told half of the 
                                                 
54 This dispute took referred to the old Jordanian Labour Law of 1960 (Amended in 1965), rather than the new 
PNA Labour Law that was published at the end of 2001. 
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workers that there was no longer any work for them and he was letting them go. The workers 
demanded their ta‘wid (severance pay). The manager refused saying that he had no money 
and that in any case there was no way that the workers could make him pay. They factory 
manager argued that the workers could take him to court if they wished, but they would get 
nothing out of him. Despite this the workers decided to start a legal case. However, their 
lawyer told them that it would take several years to process the case, and even if they received 
a favourable judgement it would be difficult to enforce as the factory owner lived outside 
Ramallah in an area controlled by the Israeli military. The lawyer advised them to go and see 
the Governor of Ramallah, Abu-Firas. However, the legal department of the Governor’s 
office told the workers there was very little that he could do to help them, as everyone was 
experiencing problems due to the intifada. 
 
The workers then decided to visit the union. The PGFTU in Ramallah had just experienced a 
major split.55 The workers went to visit the smaller faction. This faction of the PGFTU agreed 
to send someone to try and talk to the people in the factory. The owner of the factory was now 
back in the West Bank and staying with relatives in the village of Sinjal, to the north of 
Ramallah. Some of the workers, accompanied by a union representative paid the owner a 
visit. The factory owner did not know that he was dealing with the weaker branch of the 
PGFTU, and having recently seen the strike at the Al-Quds factory, agreed to make a deal. In 
the agreement, the workers received about 50% of the money due according to the law. 
Although they were not happy with this amount, the workers recognised that in the current 
situation it was probably all they would be able to obtain. 
 
Case Study 3: Nablus Pharmaceutical Factory 
Ramzi worked in a pharmaceutical factory as the night guard in a village to the west of 
Ramallah. A Palestinian who had recently returned from living in America for twenty years, 
and had invested all his savings in the business, owned the pharmaceutical factory. After 
Ramzi had been working for five months, the factory owner told him that there was no longer 
any work for him and he would have to leave. The next week the owner brought another man 
to guard the factory.  Ramzi thought he had been told to leave so that he was not employed 
long enough to be due severance pay. 56 
 
The next day Ramzi returned to the factory and demanded his pay for one month’s notice and 
the pay for the leave that he had not taken, but that he claimed he was due according to the 
labour law. The owner refused to pay as he said that he had no money. Ramzi then went to 
see a relative of the factory owner to ask for some help, but the relative said there was nothing 
that he could do. Ramzi decided to go and see a lawyer, but was told that the case was not 
worth taking to the courts as it would take too long and would probably never be enforced. 
Eventually Ramzi decided to go and see the larger faction of the PGFTU in Ramallah. The 
PGFTU agreed to take on the case, on the condition that Ramzi joined the union. The union 
sent the case to a lawyer and registered it in the court.  
 
At first the union’s lawyer tried to persuade Ramzi to negotiate with the factory owner, as he 
argued that the case would take a long time, and maybe it was better to get some money 
immediately, even it was less than that set out by the law. However, Ramzi had found another 
job and did not need the money straightaway. As the lawyer’s fees were initially being 
                                                 
55 The PGFTU in Ramallah had split after its local head had been accused of misusing funds.  He had been 
thrown out of the union and started his own rival branch that still used the PGFTU name. 
56 Severance pay was due after six months of employment. 
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covered by the PGFTU, Ramzi decided that he would push for all the money that he felt he 
was due according to the law. The court gave the lawyer a date in three months time for the 
first hearing. However, at that hearing the judge did not turn up and the case was postponed 
for another three months.  Over the next two years the case was postponed four more times.  
 
Eventually the court ruled that Ramzi was due the unpaid leave and pay for one months 
notice. However, the factory owner refused to pay the money. In the meantime the second 
intifada had started. Ramzi’s lawyer wrote a letter to the owner demanding that he pay. Again 
the owner refused. The lawyer therefore decided to visit the PNA police to see if they would 
seize some of the property belonging to the owner. However the police refused, saying that 
the owner lived outside Ramallah, and because of the Israeli checkpoints there was no way 
that they could enforce the court order. Ramzi’s lawyer therefore applied to the court for an 
enforcement order. The case had taken so long by now that there was no way that he could 
recoup even his own expenses from the relatively small amount of money that was owed. 
Four years after he had started his case, Ramzi still had not received his money. 
 
The Meaning of Legal Claims  
What is perhaps most interesting about the three case studies presented above is the extent to 
which, despite the almost compete paralysis of the formal legal system, substantive legal 
claims remained central to all the disputes. In all three case studies the workers had demanded 
the application of the law. They were by no means alone in doing so. Nearly all labour 
disputes I came across in the West Bank involved some reference to the formal requirements 
of labour law.  
 
However, to say that concepts and practices of law were pervasive is not to universalise the 
meaning of these legal claims or to say that people in the West Bank have become western 
style legal individualists.57  The predominate experience of legal rights in the West Bank 
came from the Israeli economy and were granted, however problematically, by the Israeli 
state, which was often experienced as violent and exclusionary. Legal processes therefore did 
not have moral value in and of themselves, as it was recognised that they depended on the 
contingent distribution of political resources. Furthermore, making a normative claim through 
the law did not rule out alternative normative frameworks being held simultaneously. There is 
no need to assume that the people involved in the case studies looked at the world entirely in 
legal terms. Ramzi had initially turned to a relative to see if he could get his job back, rather 
than turn immediately to the law. Law was potentially just one normative frame amongst 
many. The meanings of these legal claims were therefore specific to the historical context of 
the West Bank. 
 
The workers turned to the law not out of some sense of absolute moral value of legal 
processes, but because of the substantive financial entitlements that the law promised. All of 
the workers had only turned to the law after their jobs had come to an end. Whilst they 
continued to be employed, the law was a secondary consideration. Whilst in employment, 
many workers were reluctant to push for the application of the law in case they lost their jobs. 
However, once they had lost their jobs, not only did they have nothing to lose, but in their 
experience, particularly after working in Israel, the law provided a potential, if often distant, 
source of financial support. During the second intifada the Palestinian economy had 
collapsed. A survey from Birzeit University estimates that across the West Bank 69% of 
                                                 
57 See, for example: Merry (1990). 
 13
respondents had a family member who lost a job as a result of the intifada.58 In this context 
the substantive promises of labour represented one of the few avenues through which many 
Palestinians could support their families. In their demonstrations, the workers at the Al-Quds 
factory had referred directly to their need to support their families.  
 
However, it is also important to stress that law was not viewed in an entirely instrumental 
manner. Legal entitlements provided an effective set of promises about the nature of political 
and economic life, which it was felt that the PNA had a duty to maintain. The workers at the 
Al-Quds factory had demanded that Abu-Firas, as representative of the PNA, should enforce 
the labour law. Furthermore, although legal claims were primarily attractive because of their 
potential substantive benefits, issues relating to the fairness of procedural distribution were 
also important. According to one opinion poll taken in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 
2000 ‘equality before the law’ was seen as the greatest priority for the PNA by almost three 
quarters of all Palestinians.59 However, procedural fairness was a general aspiration. In any 
given situation the achievement of substantive rights took precedence over the procedural 
distribution. This situation will be explained below. 
 
The Enforcement of Legal Claims  
The emphasis on substantive claims put the workers in direct conflict with their employers. If 
the workers at the Al-Quds factory had been granted their demands for severance pay the 
factory owners would have probably refused to pay. If the factory owners had won, their 
employees would have been denied the means to support their families. In this context, both 
Ramzi and the workers at Al-Quds factory had pushed for the enforcement of the law. Ramzi 
had said that if there were mediation, he would inevitably come away with a worse deal than 
he had originally sought. The Al-Quds factory workers refused the initial offer of the factory 
owners and instead had demanded the full application of severance pay law. 
 
This emphasis on the enforcement of legal claims is in stark contrast to the arguments usually 
made about attitudes to disputes in the West Bank. For example, George Bisharat writes that 
negotiation and compromise by jaha (notables) are the ‘indigenous’ form of dispute 
resolution in the West Bank.60 However, during my fieldwork I was frequently told that 
people did not want mediation, as they would be forced to take less than they wanted. 
Mediation would have favoured the status quo and the stronger party in the dispute. These 
findings are also reflected in the results of a survey carried out by Gad Barzilai among Israeli-
Palestinians. Barzilai found that only 18% of his respondents favoured mediation/arbitration 
over formal legal settings for the processing of disputes.61 This is not to say that negotiated 
settlements did not occur. At the Sinjal and Al-Quds factories negotiated settlements had been 
reached. However, it would be a mistake to interpret these settlements as being reached 
through consensus or as being preferential in the eyes of the workers. Instead they were 
reluctantly accepted due to the practical constraints of the situation. 
                                                 
58 Birzeit University Development Studies Programme, The Impact of the Israeli-Imposed Siege on Palestinian 
Living Conditions, 19th February 2001, Birzeit: Birzeit University, 2001. A  UN report estimated that by early 
2001 unemployment had risen to 38%. See United Nations Special Coordinator for the Occupied Territories, The 
Impact on the Palestinian Economy of Confrontations, Mobility Restrictions and Border Closures, 1 October 
2000—31 January 2001, Gaza: United Nations Special Coordinator for the Occupied Territories, 2001, pp.10-
11. 
59 Birzeit University Development Studies Programme, An Opinion Poll on the Priorities of a Palestinian State 
(31/8/2000-2/9/2000), Birzeit: Birzeit University, 2000.  
60 Bisharat (1989), pp.39-42. 
61 Gad Barzilai, Communities and Law: Politics and Cultures of Legal Identities, Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 2003, p.129. 
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Turning to the law was not an appeal to the moral quality of legal procedures or ‘solving’ 
disputes. Rather it was concerned with the possible obtainment of substantive entitlements 
through which families could be supported. These claimed entitlements put the workers in 
direct conflict with their employers. Coercion was therefore a central feature for effectiveness 
of legal claims and access to legal entitlements. The question therefore becomes whether or 
not, and how, the formal legal system is able to deliver the coercive backing necessary for the 
realisation of claimed legal rights. 
 
In the West Bank, the PNA courts faced several problems in enforcing the law. The territorial 
structures of the Oslo Accords, combined with the historical legacy of the Palestinian police 
and their relationship with the courts, meant that the formal legal system was often unable to 
enforce legal claims. At the Sinjal factory the workers were advised that it would be very 
difficult to enforce a decision outside the centre of Ramallah. The Sinjal factory manager had 
even claimed that there was no way that the workers could make him pay severance. Ramzi 
faced similar problems. Whilst the PNA courts had jurisdiction over Palestinians throughout 
the West Bank, the Palestinian police did not have matching territorial control. The territorial 
fragmentation of the West Bank, and the resulting Israeli checkpoints, also meant that access 
to the courts was also often problematic for both legal professionals and litigants. 
Furthermore, the fact that the PNA police forces often acted more as political factions than 
police forces, meant that, as Ramzi discovered, even if court orders could be obtained and 
sent to the police, they often went unenforced. 
 
The legal philosopher Robert Cover has argued that the “organised social practice” of 
coercion is central to the study of the effects of legal processes.62 Cover argues that in what he 
calls a “well developed” legal system, coercion is so well organised that it almost goes 
without saying.63 This was not the case in the West Bank. The fragmentation of the coercive 
power of the law meant that access to formal legal entitlements was a real problem for many 
Palestinians. 
 
Alternatives to the Courts in the Enforcement of Legal Claims  
Given a weak and decentralised PNA legal system, many Palestinians searched for alternative 
forums through which they could enforce their substantive claims. It is important not to 
assume that, in the eyes of many Palestinians, the court was the proper site for the 
enforcement of legal claims. Legal claims are dynamic normative references that can be 
applied in a range of settings.64 Given that legal processes were generally seen as lacking 
moral qualities in themselves, but were instead valued for the substantive claims that could be 
made through them, the forum and procedures of enforcement were not in themselves the 
most important aspect of legal claims. This opened up the way for alternative methods of 
enforcement. Through their struggles people sought to have their substantive legal claims 
enforced through multiple mechanisms. Rather than being directly concerned with the 
technical processes and efficiency of the courts, the workers at the Al-Quds or Sinjal 
factories, or even Ramzi at the pharmaceutical factory, did not care how or where their legal 
claims were enforced.  
 
                                                 
62 Robert Cover, ‘Violence and the Word’, Yale Law Journal, 95:8 (July 1986), pp.1602fn. 
63 Cover (1986), p.1624. 
64 For example, see: Boaventura de Sousa  Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense: Law, Globalization and 
Emancipation, London: Butterworths, 2002, pp.99-16.   
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In the context of the fragmentation of the coercive power of the law, the enforcement of legal 
claims could often only be done bi-laffah (round about), through the Governor’s office or 
other PNA policing organisations. By turning to the Governor’s office, people could cut out 
the courts and turn directly to a source of legal coercion. One lawyer told me that Abu-Firas 
was qawi (strong), whilst the courts were d’if (weak).65 At the Al-Quds factory the workers 
said that Abu-Firas was the only person who could yasallim (deliver) their huquq (rights). Not 
only could he use his own police force, but also he could call on the connections that he had 
throughout Ramallah, and his reputation as a representative of Yasser Arafat. Abu-Firas also 
had connections, real or imagined, with local gangs and political activists. Although there 
were very few cases where Abu-Firas actively used coercion, his reputation was usually 
enough to enforce a decision. Due to the weak coercive power of the formal court system, 
people turned to forums such as the Governor’s office to enforce the substance of legal 
claims. In this context turning to forums such as the Governor’s office should not be seen as a 
direct challenge to the law. Rather it represented the failure of the formal court system to live 
up to its substantive promises. 
 
‘Legal Patrimonialism’ 
Whilst the Governor’s office gave people a space in which they could try to enforce their 
substantive claims, the office lacked the formal restrictions and procedures that meant it had 
to take all the cases. The Governor’s office often interpreted the law with what might be 
called a ‘nationalist’ attitude. In its work it tended to stress the importance of ‘national unity’, 
and indeed issued certificates to people who had made compromises stressing their support 
for the Palestinian sha’ab (people). This meant that the office not only tried to force people to 
make compromises in the name of wahda (unity), but also often refused to intervene in cases 
at all. The workers at the Al-Quds factory were forced to make a compromise on their formal 
legal entitlements to severance pay because of the ‘situation’. The Sinjal factory workers were 
turned away altogether. The emphasis on ‘unity’ often favoured the stronger party in the 
dispute. This resulted in a situation of ‘legal patrimonialism’ where legal entitlements were 
distributed according the prevailing balance of power.  
 
The fragmentation of the PNA meant that the mobilisation of legal coercion depended on the 
political resources of the litigants and their ability to mobilise these disparate sources of 
coercive power.  Whilst the dispute at Al-Quds, which had a high profile, was taken on by the 
Governor’s office, the workers at the Sinjal factory were turned away. Although all the cases 
outlined above concerned basic legal rights supposedly enforceable through the courts rather 
than industrial action, it took the collective strength of the Al-Quds workers to get their legal 
rights enforced. For the workers, the parallel fragmentation of the union movement, which 
was almost their only potential source of political and economic leverage, meant that their 
collective power was often limited. In Ramzi’s case, as an individual worker he had very little 
leverage and had to resort to sending the case to court, with all its attendant problems.  
 
Issues of procedural fairness were of course important. The people who turned to it did not 
see the Governor’s office as a neutral, selfless or even a particularly wise organisation. It was 
common for people to talk about Abu-Firas as a self- interested siyasi (politician), and accuse 
him of not treating all people with the same interest. There were frequent accusations that 
Abu-Firas’ office favoured the dominant economic and political personalities in Ramallah.66 
                                                 
65 Interview with lawyer, Ramallah, 22 September 200l. 
66 Abu-Firas’ family came from the village of Bayt Lifta, in what is now Israel. After 1948 many of the residents 
of Bayt Lifta had become refugees and settled in the Ramallah area, becoming important political and economic 
figures in the region. 
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One of the unionists involved in the Al-Quds strike claimed to me that Abu-Firas owed his 
position to the large families of Ramallah and therefore did not want to make problems with 
them.67 The procedural failings of the Governor’s office were well recognised. However, 
given the wider context, it was often the only forum through which people could enforce the 
substantive elements of their legal claims. The lack of a strong centralised legal system meant 
that people had to turn to alternative and less accountable forums in order to try and enforce 
the law. As Suad Joseph has argued, in situations of political fragmentation and inequality, 
people use political and personal relationships in order to enforce legal claims, resulting in 
hybrid forms of law and patronage.68   
 
In the West Bank, the major obstacle in the way of the effective application of the law was 
not the internal technical efficiency of the courts, but the fragmentation of the coercive power 
of the law. The application of the law is not simply a matter of technical adjudication. Given 
the emphasis on substantive claims, the enforcement of the law was crucial for its 
effectiveness. However, the courts lacked an organised monopoly over coercive power and 
could only problematically enforce the law. The PNA courts lacked exclusive territorial 
control over the regions they had legal jurisdiction. Furthermore, there was considerable 
political ambiguity concerning the role of the PNA police forces in relation to the court. In 
this context, the effectiveness of legal claims depended on the ability of the litigants to 
mobilise political support, beyond the narrow confines of the courthouse. To do so meant 
gaining political backing from unions, the media or relatives, amongst others. Only by doing 
so could the intervention of the Governor’s office, or any of the branches of the PNA police, 
be ensured. Without this support the law simply went unenforced and was ineffective, not just 
technically inefficient, as far as many Palestinians were concerned.  
 
Furthermore, the attractiveness of the law was not simply a question of the cultural 
appropriateness of legal values. Law does not need a monopoly on normative assumptions in 
order to be effective. In the West Bank legal claims were used both instrumentally and 
normatively. 69 Law was used normatively in that it was felt that the PNA had a duty to 
provide the substantive promises of law, through which people could support their families. 
Law was used instrumentally, as at the same time there was recognition that the practical 
manifestation of legal rights in any given context was cont ingent and depended on the 
distribution of political resources. This encouraged what might be called ‘legal 
patrimonialism’, whereby legal entitlements were distributed according to political resources, 
rather than legal procedures. In this context it is irrelevant to argue whether access to the law 
is an issue of technical improvement or cultural compatibility. Instead people were working 
within the context of political and legal possibilities available to them in order to support their 
families.  
 
Some Concluding Remarks  
It is worth concluding by asking what it will take to build an effective legal system in the 
West Bank that responds to the needs of the people who would use it. For many people the 
promotion of legal processes is seen as a key stage in the creation of a stable, democratic and 
                                                 
67 Interview with unionist, Ramallah, 12 March 200l. 
68 Suad Joseph, ‘Working the Law: A Lebanese Working –Class Case’, in Daisy Dwyer (ed.), Law and Islam in 
the Middle East, New York: Bergin and Garvey, 1990. 
69 For a similar situation in another context see: Julia Eckert, ‘Governing Laws: On the Appropriation and 
Adaptation of Control in Mumbai’, Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology Working Paper 33, Halle: Max 
Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, 2002; Julia Eckert, ‘Rules of Law and Law’s of Ruling’, Paper 
Presented to the Research Seminar in Anthropological Theory at the London School of Economics, 4 July 2003.  
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accountable Palestinian polity, which will eventually result in statehood. This paper has 
addressed these issues by focusing on the obstacles to the attainment of substantive labour 
rights. These obstacles are not due to issues of cultural compatibility, or technical efficiency, 
but are the result of the fragmentation of the coercive power of the law, caused at least in part 
by the Oslo Peace Process. A context where legal processes have no absolute moral value, but 
are instead primarily attractive because of the substantive claims that could be made though 
them, opens up space for the political manipulation of the law. However, the importance of 
forums such as the Governor’s office should not be seen as a direct challenge to the formal 
legal system. Rather it is a result of the failure of the formal legal process to live up to its 
perceived substantive promises. The territorial and organisational fragmentation of the law in 
the West Bank meant that legal claims lacked stable coercive backing, forcing people to turn 
to potentially less accountable forums for the enforcement of their legal claims. This situation 
produces a hybrid form of ‘legal patrimonialism’ where legal entitlements are distributed 
according to political connections.  It has recently been argued that territorial and 
organisational sovereignty, in the Weberian sense of a unified state monopoly on violence 
within a given territory, is not necessary for the effectiveness of legal processes.70 However, 
in the West Bank at least, where the attraction of the law for many people is the substantively 
enforceable claims that can be made through it, a centralised authority, that has a monopoly 
on coercive control, is necessary for the fulfilment of legal promises. Without a stable and 
centralised coercive foundation, both the substantive and procedural elements of legal 
processes are unobtainable. Effective legal processes are not a short cut the creation of strong 
and stable states, but depend on the existence of those very regimes. Strong states produce 
effective law, not the other way around. 
                                                 
70 The literature on this issue is voluminous. For a view see: Dora Kostakopolou, ‘Floating Sovereignty: A 
Pathology or a Necessary Means of State Evolution?’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 22:1 (March 2002), 
pp.135-156; Ann Mason, ‘Constructing Authority Alternatives in Colombia: Globalisation and the 
Transformation of Governance’, Crisis States Working Paper 40, London: Development Research Centre, LSE, 
2004; John Ruggie, ‘Territoriality and Beyond: Problematising Modernity in International Relations’, 
International Organisation, 47:1 (Winter 1993), pp.139-174. 
 18
 
 
 
Key:      Area A        Area B         Area C 
 
Map 1: West Bank Showing Areas A, B and C According to the Oslo Agreements 
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